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Historic rights in the Law of the Sea has assumed prominence in recent times with China’s 
publication of the so-called nine-dash map, which highlighted its claims to maritime zones 
and certain disputes islands in the South China Seas allegedly based on Historic claims. This 
paper seeks to explore the State Practice of African States in order to determine whether 




Historic rights in the Law of the Sea has assumed prominence in recent times, especially ever 
since China’s publication of the so-called nine-dash line map,1 which highlighted its claims to 
maritime zones and certain disputed islands in the South China Seas allegedly based on 
Historic rights. The notability of China’s historic rights claims could be traced to the two 
Note Verbales sent by China in 2009 to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General in 
response to the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam in the Southern part of the South 
China Seas, as well as the sole submission of Vietnam to the Northern part made to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).2 Both Note Verbales, 
accompanied by an attached map, requested the CLCS not to consider the joint submission of 
Malaysia and Vietnam, as well as the sole submission of Vietnam, insisting as follows: 
“China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and 
the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant 
waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map). The above 
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position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, and is widely known by 
the international community.”3 
 
This U-shaped line in the attached map to the Note Verbales, which is generally referred to as 
the nine-dash line because the line is broken into nine segments, constitutes China’s supposed 
claim over waters and islands in the South China Seas. In its Note Verbales in 2011 to the 
UN Secretary-General, again in response to the aforementioned submissions to the CLCS, 
China appeared to set out more clearly the basis of its claim to islands and adjacent waters 
within the nine-dash line in the South China Seas as follows: 
“China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and 
the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant 
waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. China’s sovereignty and related 
rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea are supported by abundant 
historical and legal evidence.” (Italics mine for emphasis)4 
 
There has been some debate on whether China’s historic claim over the Islands and waters 
within the so-called nine-dash line is consistent with international law. Some have argued, 
amongst other things, that this claim of China is inconsistent with international law as it is 
outside the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) 
82, to which China is a State Party,5 which makes extensive provisions for recognised 
maritime zones claims. It has also been argued that the UNCLOS 82 makes rather limited 
specific references to historic titles, namely as regards the provisions of Article 10 not 
applying to ‘historic’ bays and relating to Article 15, which provides that the general rule 
governing the delimitation of overlapping territorial seas would not apply in instances of 
‘historic title or other special circumstances.’6 The latter argument point to the limited 
coverage of historic titles under the UNCLOS 82, which applies more to near shore waters of 
the Coastal Claimant State and argue that this does not apply to the claim of China as regards 
the South China Seas.7 On the other hand, some scholars argue that China historic claim is 
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http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf  
5 China became a Party to UNCLOS 82 on the 7th of June 1996. See 
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valid and consistent under international law.8 Although, there are a variety of arguments 
raised by scholars in support of China’s claim, a particularly intriguing argument, which in 
this author’s view is relevant, with regard to the present paper, is the argument that opines 
that even if historic claims are not specifically regulated by the UNCLOS 82, these claims are 
arguably governed by the rules and principles of general international law, which ostensibly 
permits such types of claims.9 Scholars adopting the latter argument rely on the preamble of 
UNCLOS 82, which indicates that this crucial treaty is both codification and progressive 
development of the law of the sea, and affirms ‘that matters not regulated by this Convention 
[UNCLOS 82] continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international 
law.’10 Of course, it should be noted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) 1969 states that the context for interpreting a treaty shall of course include the 
preamble.11 The question therefore is whether sufficient States Practices could be discerned 
that would establish that historic claims, such as that of China over the South China Seas, are 
indeed part of General (Customary) International Law.12 Fortunately, the task in this article is 
not cumbersome, as the author does not seek to extrapolate the States Practices from all 
regions of the world, but rather have the rather limited and specific mandate of exploring 
State Practice as it relates to the African region. This article aims to explore the State Practice 
of only African States in order to determine whether African States acknowledge and 
recognise historic rights claims as being in line with General (Customary) International Law. 
The article would be divided into three substantive sections. The first section would briefly 
explore the concept historic title in maritime waters under international law. Thereafter, the 
second section would briefly engage with the issue of State Practice under international law 
with a view to identifying the evidence one would explore in seeking to identify historic 
rights in African State Practice. The third section would then seek to identify if there are any 
                                                          
8 See for instance, Fu Ying and Wu Shicun, “South China Sea: How we got to the stage”, National Interest 
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general) international law. Aust, Ibid. p.9 points out that General International Law ‘…is a rather vague 
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International Law Customary Law Only?”(1993) 4 EJIL, pp534-541. 
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evidence from the practices of African States and relevant regional organisations that indicate 
historic rights claims over maritime waters in the African region. Finally, the article would 
then end with some brief remarks on the findings. 
 
2. Historic rights in Maritime Waters under International Law 
It is important to be clear on the different variants of historic claims in maritime waters under 
international law. The reason is that in the discourse on the issue, especially in relation to the 
South China Seas, there occasionally are ambiguity on this. It is sometimes not clear if the 
point being raised is, on the one hand, an assertion that China’s proclamation of historic title 
is a claim of sovereignty, based on historical evidence, over all the waters falling within the 
ambit of the nine-dash line, which ordinarily under the UNCLOS 82 would not fall within the 
realm of China’s sovereignty (i.e. historic waters); or, on the other hand, if its assertion of 
rights over the South China Seas falling short of an actual claim to territorial sovereignty (i.e. 
historic rights).13 The former is obviously more controversial than the latter. According to 
Dupuy and Dupuy: 
“The recent turmoil created by the competing sovereignty claims of several 
countries over islands and waters in the South China Sea has caused the 
resurgence of the concept of “historic rights”[ ]. Although the term historic rights 
(sometimes confusingly used in this context in combination with other germane 
notions, such as historic waters and historic title) has often been imbued with a 
certain degree of confusion and controversy in international law …”14 
 
Zou Keyuan, acknowledging this confusion in one of his studies on historic rights, states as 
follows: 
“…there are a number of legal terms in the historical context, such as “right”, 
“Title” and “consolidation”, [ ] which may cause confusion. It is even more 
complicated when one tries to explore so-called historic rights in the maritime 
area, particularly when the term is used along with other related terms such as 
historic waters and historic bays.”15 
 
                                                          
13 See Clive R. Symmons, “Historic Waters and Historic Rights in the South China Sea: A Critical Appraisal,” 
in The South China Sea UNCLOS and State Practice Conference Proceedings: October 24-25, 2013, Haikou, 
China, organized by National Institute for South China Sea Studies and Collaborative Innovation Centre of 
South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University, pp. 22-49 and  Florian Dupuy and Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “A Legal 
Analysis of China’s Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea”, (2013) 107(1) American Journal of 
International Law, pp.124 at 124 and 134-136. 
14 Dupuy and Dupuy, “A Legal Analysis of China’s Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea”, (2013) 
107(1) American Journal of International Law, pp.124-141 at 124 and 134-136. 
15 Zou Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice,” (2001) 32(2) Ocean 
Development & International Law, pp.149-168 at 149 
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The confusion as regard the terminologies is further accentuated when one reads different 
literature on this issue, but what, however, comes out clearly is that there are two broad 
aspects to this, which must be clarified for a more coherent engagement with relevant State 
Practice. For instance, Dupuy and Dupuy point out that ‘[o]ne should … distinguish between 
a historic “title” of full territorial sovereignty (whether or not consolidated by State conduct) 
and historic “rights”, which may include rights falling short of sovereignty, such as 
exceptional fishing rights or the right of passage.’16 They then go on to identify that in the 
law of the sea historic “title” amounting to a claim of sovereignty would fall into the category 
of “historic waters.”17 Keyuan Zou ,on his part, stressing the dual nature of these rights, 
points out that historic rights, include historic waters  and also covers ‘certain special rights 
without involving a claim of full sovereignty, such as historic fishing rights, which a State 
might have acquired in particular areas of the high seas.’18 The Tribunal in the South China 
Sea Arbitration sought to clarify the various use of terminologies as regards historic claims 
by stating as follows: 
“The term ‘historic rights’ is general in nature and can describe any rights that a 
State may possess that would not normally arise under the general rules of 
international law, absent particular historical circumstances. Historic rights may 
include sovereignty, but may equally include more limited rights, such as fishing 
rights or rights of access, that fall well short of a claim of sovereignty. ‘Historic 
title’, in contrast, is used specifically to refer to historic sovereignty to land or 
maritime areas. ‘Historic waters’ is simply a term for historic title over maritime 
areas, typically exercised either as a claim to internal waters or as a claim to the 
territorial sea … Finally, a ‘historic bay’ is simply a bay in which a State claims 
historic waters.”19  
 
 
It, however, vital to also point out that the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea 
Arbitration was of the view that with the coming into force of  UNCLOS 82 and the 
ratification of the treaty by China that any historic rights it was claiming within the ‘nine-
dash line’ were superseded by the new maritime zones introduced by UNCLOS.20 It is, 
however, interesting to note that the Tribunal, despite referring to the preamble of the 
                                                          
16 At p.137 
17 Ibid 
18 See note 11 above at p.152 
19 Para.225, South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086  See also para 100 of Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1982, p. 18 at pp. 73-74 
20 Paras.261 to 263, South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016. For an interesting analysis see Sophia 
Kopela, “Historic Titles and Historic Rights in the Law of the Sea in the Light of the South China Sea 
Arbitration”, (2017) 48(2) Ocean Development & International Law, pp.181-207 
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UNCLOS 82 in various places of its judgement on the merits,21 did not specifically engage 
with the aspect of the preamble affirming ‘that matters not regulated by this Convention 
continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.’22 The 
Tribunal in so doing appears to have missed the opportunity to engage with the rather 
convincing argument raised by certain scholars, such as Gao and Jia, that UNCLOS 82, 
relying on this particular preamble, had preserved the Customary International Law (CIL) on 
the concept of historic title claims.23  
 
 
It would therefore be important to engage with State Practice on historic rights’ claims in 
maritime waters with the understanding that States may claim historic waters, on the one 
hand, or historic rights falling short of a claim for sovereignty, on the other hand, such as 
fishing rights, the rights to harvest oysters etc. A notable definition of historic waters is that 
provided by Bouchez, who defines the concept as: 
“Waters over which the coastal State, contrary to the generally applicable rules of 
international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a substantial period 
of time, exercises sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of 
State”24. 
 
Perhaps the most authoritative juridical definition of historic water is the provided by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Fisheries Case,25 a definition endorsed by the same 
court over 40 years later, in the Case concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute, in relation to the Gulf of Fonseca, which defined it as ‘waters which are treated as 
internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an 
historic title.’26 
 
The requirements that must be satisfied in order to successfully establish a valid historic 
waters’ claim is proof of long-established activities and the continuous exercise of these 
activities with the acquiescence of other states.27 It is also interesting to note that the same 
                                                          
21 See for instance, paras 245, 421, 515 and 939, South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016. 
22 See preamble 8 
23 See Gao and Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications”, op.cit at 
p.123 and Kopela, “Historic Titles and Historic Rights in the Law of the Sea in the Light of the South China Sea 
Arbitration”, op.cit at.pp.184-187. 
24 Bouchez, L.J. The Regime of Bays in International Law, (Sythoff Leyden, 1964) at p.281 
25 UK v. Norway, Judgement of December 18, 1951, I.C. J. Reports 1951, p.116 at p.130 
26 El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua intervening, Judgement of September 11, 1992, Para.384, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/75/075-19920911-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf  
27 See UN Report, “Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including Historic Bays”, UN Doc.A/CN.4/143, at 
pp.13 and 16 and Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice,” op.cit at p.151 
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burden of proof is required to establish a claim of limited historic rights falling short of a 
claim of sovereignty, as well.28  
 
Although, certain scholars from China have argued that the claim of China over the South 
China Seas Water is a claim of historic waters, some other Chinese scholars are rather wary 
of this position. The latter scholars would prefer to utilise the relevant historic evidence to 
establish China’s sovereignty over the contested islands in the South China seas and argue 
that under the UNCLOS such islands generate their own maritime zones. Furthermore, these 
scholars appear to focus more on arguing that China has historic rights falling short of a 
sovereignty claim over areas in the South China Seas, which have been preserved under 
CIL.29 The position of government of China appears to be more consistent with the latter 
view. For instance, in a statement dated 12 July 2016 issued by the Chinese Foreign Minister 
rejecting the award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration it was stated: 
“China has sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao (the South China Sea Islands); China has 
internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf based on its sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao; and China has historic rights in the South 
China Sea.”30 
 
3. State Practice and International Law 
Due to the nature of the international system, as a horizontal, decentralised one lacking a 
single centralised legislator, with Sovereign States as the main subjects, the activities of 
States (or State Practices) play a crucial role in creating, elucidating and determining what the 
international law actually is in a particular area, which would regulate the subjects operating 
within this anarchical system.31 Dixon, whilst acknowledging that any attempted definition of 
State Practice would not be exhaustive provides a guideline as to what one should look out 
for in seeking to discern State Practice.32 He points out that these include “actual activity 
(acts and omissions), statements made in respect of concrete situations or disputes, statements 
of legal principle made in the abstract (such as those preceding the adoption of a resolution in 
                                                          
28 See Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), Judgement, 24 February, 1982, I.C.J. Reports 
1982, p. 18 at 72-73, paras.98 to 100  
29 Gao and Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications,”op.cit. pp.108-
122 and Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice,” op.cit at pp.151-163 
30 See Remarks by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the Award of the So-called Arbitral Tribunal in the 
South China Sea Arbitration, 2016/07/12, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1380003.shtml  
31 See generally Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics(with forewords by 
Stanley Hoffman and Andrew Hurrell), 4th edition, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 
32 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th edition, (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p.31 
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the General Assembly), national legislation and the practice of international organisations.”33 
He further points out that certain scholars take the view that any activity of a State may 
amount to State Practice with obviously varying weights given to the different State 
Practices.34 Shaw, whilst acknowledging that certain scholars do take the viewpoint that State 
Practice could not be discerned from mere statements of States, but rather from its activities 
involving such State actually taking action, points out that this is a minority view.35 He then 
proceeds to endorse the broad definition of Akehurst to the effect that ‘state practice covers 
any act or statements by a state from which views about customary international law may be 
inferred’ as being substantial correct.36 Churchill, on his part, also acknowledges that State 
Practice is ‘a broad and flexible term’ that may include the following:  
 
“legislation enacted by national authorities, decisions of domestic courts, 
statements made by Government ministers and their legal advisers as to what they 
believe international law on a particular question to be, diplomatic 
correspondence between States, protests by States against the acts of other States 
that are considered to infringe international law and so on.”37  
 
He further added that State Practice in a broader sense could also include treaties, as well as 
“collective State actions within international organisations.”38 In exploring African State 
Practice on Historic Rights in the subsequent section, I would be adopting a rather broad 
definition of State Practice by exploring a wide-range of activities of African States to discern 
what the African State Practice is on historic rights.  
 
It must be mentioned briefly here before progressing to the next section that there are two 
main impacts that State Practice may have in international law. First, it is a key element, 
along with opinio juris, in seeking to discern whether there is sufficient State practice to 
establish CIL, in this case CIL on historic maritime claims. Obviously, as regards, 
establishing CIL, since the focus is on a particular region, the African region, it is doubtful 
that the State Practice, if any at all, on such historic titles would by itself suffice to establish 
                                                          
33 Ibid 
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35 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 8th edition, (Cambridge University Press, 2017) at p.62 
36 See Shaw, ibid, citing Michael Akehurst, “Custom as a source of International Law”, (1976) 47(1) British 
Year Book of International Law, pp.1-53 at pp.1-2. 
37 Robin R. Churchill, “The Impact of State Practice on the Jurisdictional Framework Contained in the LOS 
Convention”, in Alex G. Oude Elferink, ed. Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: The Role of the LOS 




CIL.39 However, if there is sufficient evidence of such State Practice in the African region, it 
may be explored along with State Practices in other regions of the world to seek to determine 
whether CIL already existed prior to the UNCLOS 82 or whether it subsequently emerged 
after the UNCLOS 82 was adopted.40  
 
Second, State Practice may be used as an element in treaty interpretation, in this particular 
case as an element to seek to clarify the position of UNCLOS 82 as regards historic titles. 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT) 1969 states: 
“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.   
2. …  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) …  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.” 
 
4. African State Practice on Historic Rights  
Africa consists of 55 States,41 of which 40 are coastal States, with the remaining being 
landlocked States.42 In relation to the principles of modern law of the Sea African States are 
relatively new comers in engaging with this very important area of international law since 
most them became independent sovereign States fairly recently.43 Very few of these States 
participated in the 1958 First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), 
which led to the adoption of the 1958 Conventions.44 Eventually, at the time of the Third 
                                                          
39 The best that could happen if at all there is sufficient regional State practice on this, along with opinio juris is 
to establish a regional customary international law. See Asylum Case(Columbia v. Peru), I.C.J. Rep.1950, p.266 
40 See Preamble 8 of UNCLOS 82 
41 Note that the Republic of South Sudan became the newest African State, when it became independent on the 
9th of July 2011 and has since become a member of both the African Union and the United Nations. Also, note 
the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, which became independent on 27 February 1976, though a member of 
the African Union is not currently a member of the United Nations and there are still some issues on its 
recognition as a State, notably by Morocco. Morocco withdrew in 1984 from the Organisation of African Unity 
because of its recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, but was readmitted in 2017 to the African 
Union.    
42 The landlocked countries in Africa are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
43 Most African States became independent sovereign States in by the 1950s (actually only a few such as Ghana, 
Guinea, Sudan and Tunisia), with most of becoming independent in the 1960s. 
44 Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; the High Seas; the Continental Shelf and the Fishing 
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. The Second United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS II) convened in 1960 did not produce any Conventions. 
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United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which eventually led to the 
adoption of the UNCLOS 82, even more African States participated, having since gained 
their independence. In fact, it would be right to say that African States played a crucial role in 
instigating the UNCLOS III.45 Although, there are historic evidence on Africa’s participation 
in the sea predating colonialism, the colonial experience has clouded such engagement with 
the sea with the related opacity on African historic evidence as it relates to the sea.46  Thus 
certain African States were rather suspicious of the Eurocentric nature of pre-UNCLOS III 
law of the sea, including the whole notion of historic rights. For instance, the representative 
of Guinea, Mr Diallo, at the UNCLOS III is reported to have stated as follows: 
“With regard to ‘historic rights,’ ... the concept was nothing other than a 
manifestation of the right of the strongest and a vestige of colonialism, which 
[Guinea] would oppose in all its forms. To perpetuate those rights would be a 
grave injustice to the young States that we’re struggling not only for political but 
also for economic independence.”47 
 
Nonetheless, there are some evidence of State Practices in Africa that relate to historic rights 
in maritime waters. The first case in point, that would be explored is the African States 
Regional Seminar held in Yaoundé on 20-30 June 1972, which adopted, amongst other 
things, the following recommendations on "'Historic Bays' and 'Historic Rights':" 48 The 
Yaoundé Seminar’s recommendations stated as follows: 
“(1) That the "historic rights" acquired by certain neighboring African States in a 
part of the Sea which may fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of another State 
should be recognized and safeguarded. 
(2) The impossibility of an African State to provide evidence of an uninterrupted 
claim over a historic bay should not constitute any obstacle to the recognition of 
the rights of that State over such a bay.” 
 
While this appears to be an indication of recognition of the concepts of ‘historic bays’ and 
‘historic rights’ by certain African States, this instrument, unfortunately does not provide any 
definition of these concepts. We are thus not clear whether the reference in this instrument is 
to historic waters or perhaps to historic rights falling short of the assertion of sovereignty. 
Conceivably, one could interpret the mention of historic bays in paragraph 2 as a reference to 
                                                          
45 Egede, E., Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind, (Heidelberg, Springer, 2011) at pp.1-30; 
46 Ibid at pp.1-2 
47 UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.III, First Committee A/CONF.19/8, 18th Meeting, 1974, para.6 
48 Para. I (b) A/AC.138/79, reprinted in International Legal Materials Vo.XII (1) January 1973, p.210. The 
Seminar was attended by 16 States: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Dahomey(now Republic of Benin), 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast(now Cote d’Ivoire), Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Zaire(Democratic Republic of Congo). 
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historic waters encapsulating sovereignty over such waters, whilst the allusion to historic 
rights in the context it is used in paragraph 1 as a reference to such rights that fall short of a 
claim to sovereignty. However, what is perhaps interesting is a clear intention to limit in 
paragraph 2 the burden of proof that would be imposed on African States as regard evidence 
to be provided for such historic waters claim. It stresses that the ‘impossibility of an African 
State to provide evidence of an uninterrupted claim over a historic bay’ should not be an 
obstacle to the recognition of the historic rights of such African State over such a bay. By so 
doing, it would appear here that the instrument was claiming an exception to the usual burden 
of proof to establish such historic title, at least as regards historic bays. Goldie in his seminal 
article on historic bays in international law sought to explain this exception by a reference to 
the African Continent’s colonial past. He said as follows: 
“The exception, in paragraph two above, of the practice in former colonial areas 
pursued by the former colonial power refers to the problem of how much 
credence should be given to the formulations and policies arising from a former 
colonial occupation. A major maritime colonial power may, in the pursuit of 
vindicating a policy giving the freedom of the high seas the widest possible 
geographical extent, have determinedly refrained from championing a subject 
community's previously acquired, or possible inchoate, historic rights in order to 
remain consistent in its global policy. Or, alter- natively, it may have refrained 
from enforcing such historic rights against third states in order to give a quid pro 
quo for the opening up to the access of the world community by such third states 
of their enclosed seas. Such a consistency of policy, the African Regional 
Seminar indicates, would have been bought at too high a price and should not be 
permitted to continue to provide a ruling principle in the post-colonial age.”49 
 
It is, however, not clear from this instrument if this limitation of the burden under paragraph 
2, based on the Continent’s colonial past, should be regarded as also applying to historic 
rights claim falling short of a claim for sovereignty, since the burden required for historic 
waters under international law are meant to be the same as that required by the former. 
 
Even though, the Yaoundé Regional Seminar recommendations touches on historic rights, 
when one looks at the number of States that participated in the Seminar, 16 in number, this is 
comparatively low in relation to the total number of States in the African continent. It is also 
interesting to note that the subsequent 1974 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), an African 
wide Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea adopted by the OAU Council of 
Ministers at its 21st ordinary session was silent on historic rights and titles.50In the preamble 
                                                          
49 L.F.E. Goldie, “Historic Bays in International Law: An Impressionistic Overview”, (1984)11(2) Syracuse 
Journal of International Law & Commerce, pp.211-273 at 264 
50 OAU Doc. A/CONF.62/33 1974; UN UNCLOS III Official Records (1974) III 63-65. 
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of the Declaration, the OAU (now the African Union), affirmed that it was its ‘responsibility 
to harness the natural and human resources of [the African continent] for the total 
advancement of [the African] peoples in all spheres of human endeavour’ and that ‘African 
countries have a right to exploit the marine resources around the African continent for the 
economic benefit of African people’.51 Yet the Declaration did not mention historic rights and 
titles, though it engaged with important areas of the law of the sea, such as: the territorial sea 
and straits; the regime of islands; the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) concept (including the 
exclusive fishery zone); regional arrangements; fishing activities in the high seas; the transfer 
of technology; scientific research; the preservation of the marine environment, as well as the 
international regime and international machinery for the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.52 The notable absence of a mention of historic 
rights in this African wide Declaration on the Law of the Sea, especially since it was adopted 
about two years after the Yaoundé Seminar, would appear to suggest a lack of consensus, 
even amongst African States, on the applicability of the concept under international law. 
 
 
Another notable illustration of African State Practice on historic rights is the Gulf of 
Sidra claim by Libya. In 1973, the Libyan government circulated a note claiming the Gulf of 
Sidra (also known as Sirte or Surt) as a historic and vital bay and thus part of its internal 
waters.53 The aim of the claim was to seek to enclose the waters of this purported historic bay 
within a straight line of   approximately 300 miles connecting the two parts of the coast at the 
cities of Benghazi and Misurata at a latitude of 32 degrees and 30 minutes north.54 That same 
year the Libyan government notified the United States of America (USA) and the United. 
Nations of this claim. Interestingly, we see this claim of Libya justified on two important 
grounds - firstly, based on its vital ‘security interests’ and secondly, on the basis of sovereign 
rights and possession exercised over the waters the Gulf for a long period of time. It would 
appear that this assertion by Libya was a claim based on the Gulf as historic waters. It further 
put in place a regime requiring foreign vessels navigating in the Gulf to request prior 
                                                          
51 Ibid at 63 par 1 and 9. 
52 Ibid at 63-65. 
53 See Declaration of October 10, 1973, reprinted in John M. Spinnato, “Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis of 
Libya’s Claim to the Gulf of Sidra”, (1983) 13 Ocean Development & International Law, p.65 at 67-68. Also, 
see United States Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
Limits in the Seas No.112, United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims, March 9, 1992, 
pp.8-9 and 17-18, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf . 
54 Francesco Francioni, “The Status of the Gulf of Sirte in International Law”, (1984) 11(2) Syracuse Journal of 
International Law & Commerce, pp.311-326 at 312-313 
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mandatory authorisation from the Libyan government. The USA filed in 1974 a protest 
against the Libyan claim. It then subsequently took steps to challenge this claim by 
conducting military manoeuvres in the contested area, which eventually escalated into a 
military conflict between the two States that led to the downing of two Libyan jets by 
American fighter jets.55 In its protest, the USA took the view that the claim of the Libyan 
government was inconsistent with the international law, as codified in the 1958 Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the applicable Convention at that time. In 
addition, it asserted that the claim on historic grounds did not ‘meet the international law 
standards of past, open, notorious and effective exercise of authority, continuous exercise of 
authority and acquiescence of foreign nations.’56 Recently, the USA has also made freedom 
of navigation operational assertions as regard the Libyan historic waters claim over the Gulf 
of Sidra.57 Furthermore, other western States, as well as the former USSR have also 
challenged the claim of Libya.58 It has been said that the crucial problem with Libya’s claim 
was its failure to adduce any real historical evidence in support of its claim and the absence 
of acquiescence by other nations.59 Blum in his analysis of the Gulf of Sidra incident 
appeared to suggest that while old claims to historic waters that predate the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions and the UNCLOS 82 may be accepted by the international community if the 
claimant State satisfies the burden of proof for such claim, it may not be accepted in respect 
of new claims made post the aforementioned Conventions applicable to the sea, especially 
when made by newly independent developing States. Writing before the UNCLOS 82 came 
into force, noted as follows: 
“Claims to historic waters in general (and to historic bays in particular) are relics 
of an older and by now largely obsolete legal regime. It will thus be readily 
understood that, while the international community may still be willing to 
                                                          
55 Ibid at 311, 313-314 
56 Ibid at 313 
57 See U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, 
http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/FON_Report_FY15.pdf ; U.S. Department of 
Defence Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2014, 
http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/20150323%202015%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%
20Report.pdf; U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2013, 
http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/FY2013%20DOD%20Annual%20FON%20Report.p
df ; U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 2000  
http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/FY2000%20DOD%20Annual%20FON%20Report.p
df  and U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 
http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/FY1998%20DOD%20Annual%20FON%20Report.p
df  
58 See Z.Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice,” op.cit. at p153 
59 Yehuda Z. Blum, “The Gulf of Sidra Incident”, (1986)80(3) American Journal of International Law, pp.668-
677 at 674-676 
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consider, in exceptional circumstances, the validity of already existing claims of 
this kind, it has firmly rejected any attempts to establish any new maritime claims 
of an extravagant character. This approach is dictated by the realization that any 
such claims - if successful - clearly encroach on what otherwise would be 
considered the common domain of the international community.”60 
 
Furthermore, he pointed out as follows: 
 
“...the current law of the sea has frozen the existing situation in regard to historic 
bays, with a view to preventing the emergence of new “historic” claims. At first 
sight, this approach may appear to operate unfairly to the advantage of the “old” 
(essentially European) states that over the years were able to establish such 
privileged claims in their favor. In contrast, according to this view, the “new” 
states of Asia, Africa and Latin America owing to the relative brevity of their 
statehood, have been unable to build up such time- honored claims, unless they 
were formerly asserted on their behalf by the colonial power.”61 
 
It is interesting to note that in making the two statements quoted above, Blum did not refer to 
any significant authority in support of his assertion of the distinction between “old” historic 
claims essentially made by “old”, mostly European, States and “new” claims made by 
relatively “new” States, including those from Africa. This distinction and trend of arguments 
on historic waters claims raises some concerns. First, it would perpetuate the inherent 
inequality in the law of the sea that pushed developing States to push for the third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) to fashion out a new law of the sea 
Convention.62 It is argued that in the interest of equality of States and fairness, the concept of 
historic water claims should apply to all States or it should not apply at all. Second, the so-
called distinction appears to be justified by the rather erroneous assumption that relatively 
“new” States including those from Africa could not possibly have historic evidence that 
predates the colonial era. As has been pointed out somewhere above, this is simply not 
correct, as there are historical evidence available in public domain that affirms that peoples in 
Africa, some of whom are now part of the so-called “new” States, had engaged with the sea, 
even prior to the colonial period.63 It is interesting to note that in December 1986, when the 
U.S Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, published "Navigation Rights and the 
                                                          
60 Ibid at 671 
61 Ibid at 676. See for instance, the award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration, Phase I 
Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute, Paras. 448-449 and 489 identifying some difficulties with historic 
claims vis-à-vis colonialism https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/517 
62 Egede, Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind, op.cit. at pp.8-10 
63 Ibid at pp.1-3. See also Continental Shelf (Tunisia v.Libya), Judgement, 24 February, 1982, I.C.J. Reports 
1982, p. 18 at 72-73, paras.98-99 and Eritrea v.Yemen Arbitration, Second Stage, Delimitation at p.13 
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Gulf of Sidra," in GIST, a reference aid on U.S Foreign relations, it actually referred to the 
history of U.S responses, dating back to the 18th century, to the attempts by North African 
States [perhaps this should read as ‘peoples’] to restrict navigation in these waters.64 Surely, 
the reference to evidence from the 18th century would seem to indicate the willingness of the 
U.S. and other States to consider historic evidence that predates colonial era. In the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v.Libya) case, it is noted that Tunisia in seeking to establish its 
historic rights referred to periods predating colonialism. In the judgment, the court stated as 
follows: 
“Tunisia claimed to have exercised sovereignty over these areas, and cited in 
support legislative acts and other indicia of the exercise of supervision and 
control dating back to the time "whereof the memory of man runneth not to the 
contrary". There is insistence on Tunisia's part that these rights have been 
recognized for centuries by other States.”65  
 
It is precisely for this reason, as identified by Goldie above, that the African States Regional 
Seminar held in Yaoundé on 20-30 June 1972, in its in its  recommendations on "'Historic 
Bays' and 'Historic Rights,’ included the exception to the burden of proof'. Clearly, if the 
evidence during the colonial era contradicts credible historical evidence predating 
colonialism, because of the likelihood of the colonial power not necessarily seeking the 
interest of the colonised peoples, such colonial evidence should be discountenanced in 
determining uninterrupted claim. It simply would be untenable to accept in contemporary law 
of the sea an application of a concept of historic rights that puts certain States, especially 
African States, at a disadvantage due to their unfortunate colonial experience.  
 
Apart from the Gulf of Sirtra claim of Libya, there are certain African States that have 
claimed historic rights, with some including the concept of historic rights in their national 
legislation. It must be underscored that this is a rather limited number of African States. For 
instance, Kenya in its Maritime Zones Act Cap.371 of 1989 states that ‘[f]or the purpose of 
Article 7 of [the UNCLOS 82] Ungwana Bay (formerly known as Formosa Bay) shall be 
deemed to be and always to have been an historic bay; and the Minister may, by notice 
published in the Gazette, declare any other bays or waters to be historic bays or waters.”66 
                                                          
64 See J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith (eds), Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd edition, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012) at pp.46-47 
65 Judgement, 24 February, 1982, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18 at 72, para.99  
66 Section 3(3) 
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Kenya had closed the Bay in 1960.67 As far back as June 1969, the Kenyan government 
further issued a declaration declaring the bay as an historic one in order to ‘safeguard the vital 
interests of the inhabitants of the coastal region and to confirm the practice which has always 
existed.’68 The United States of America has refused to recognise this claim and in 1990 and 
1998 conducted freedom of navigation operational assertions as regard the bay.69 Mauritius, 
also in its previous Maritime Zones Act No.13 of 1977 referred to historic waters. This 
legislation conferred on the Prime Minister the power to adopt regulations specifying the 
limits of the historic waters and stated “[t]he sovereign right of Mauritius extends and has 
always extended, to the historic waters and to the seabed and subsoil underlying, and the 
airspace over, the historic waters.”70 The Act No.13 of 1977was repealed and replaced by the 
Mauritius Maritime Zone Act, No. 2 of 2005.71 The latter legislation under the interpretation 
section indicates that the Maritime zones of Mauritius includes ‘historic waters’ and that 
“Historic waters means the historic waters of Mauritius prescribed under section 11.”72 
Section 11 of the legislation states that: “[t]he Prime Minister may, by regulations, prescribe 
the limits of the historic waters of Mauritius.” In a 2005 Regulations, Mauritius also describes 
an historic bay closing line for Mathurin Bay on the island of Rodrigues. In addition, in a 
recent regulation made by the relevant Minister of Mauritius pursuant to their Maritime Zone 
Act, the Maritime Zones (Conduct of Marine Scientific Research) Regulations 2017, in its 
interpretation section stressed that the Mauritius ‘National Jurisdiction’ includes historic 
waters.73 This claim has been challenged by the USA as not meeting the criteria of an historic 
bay.74 It, however, does not appear that the Mauritius government has taken any actual steps 
to implement and enforce its historic waters claim despite the extant legislation and 
regulations. Another point worth noting is that it has been noted by a renowned scholar, 
writing on the development of fisheries in Mauritius, that though it is not specifically 
                                                          
67 See Natalino Ronzitti, “Is the Gulf of Taranto an Historic Bay?(1984) 11(2) Syracuse Journal of International 
Law & Commerce, p.275 at 276 
68 See Symmonds, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Re-Appraisal, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008) at p.102 
69 See U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, 
http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/FY1998%20DOD%20Annual%20FON%20Report.p
df  and U.S DOD 2005.1.M-Navy JAG, http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/Kenya2014.pdf  
70 See section 8. Also, see section 2. 
71 Section 29 
72 See section 1 
73 See Section 2(e) 
74 See United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs: Limits in the Seas, No.140 – Mauritius: Archipelagic and other Maritime Claims and Boundaries, July 
8, 2014 at p.6, https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/c16065.htm This claim was challenged by the USA as not 
meeting the criteria of an historic bay. 
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legislated for, Mauritius claims traditional fishing rights over the northern and distant Saya de 
Malha bank complex. The scholar argues that this is presumably incorporated in the 
provisions of the relevant legislation on historic waters.75 It is difficult to agree with this 
assumption, as this would tend to obfuscate the distinction between historic waters and other 
historic rights falling short of a sovereignty claim under international law. 
 
In addition, Seychelles in its Maritime Zones Act no.15 of 1977 referred to historic waters as 
follows: 
 
“1) The President may, by Order published in the Gazette, specify the limits of 
the historic waters. 
(2) The sovereign rights of Seychelles extends, and has always extended, to the 
historic waters and to the seabed and subsoil underlying, and the air space over, 
the historic waters.”76  
 
The United States of America commenting on the Seychelles 1977 had indicated that it 
claims authority to designate historic waters.77 There is no indication that other States have 
challenged this legislation. Perhaps, it is because there is no evidence that the Seychelles 
government has actually designated any part of the seas as constituting its historical waters. 
This point is now a moot because the subsequent Seychelles legislation - Maritime Zones 
Act, 1999 (Act No. 2 of 1999) - which repealed the 1977 legislation, does not mention 
historic waters and merely refers to “maritime zone” as meaning:  
“(a) The internal waters; 
(b) The archipelagic waters; 
(c) The territorial sea; 
(d) The contiguous zone; 
(e) The exclusive economic zone; or  
(f) The continental shelf.”78 
 
On historic rights falling short of a claim for sovereignty, we see Tunisia, an African State, 
claiming historic rights to fishing activities, which it maintained was derived from the long-
established interests and activities of its population in exploiting the fisheries of the bed and 
                                                          
75 Erik C. Paul, Fisheries Development and the Food Needs of Mauritius (A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam/Boston, 
1987) at pp. 4- 5. 
76 Section 8. See also sections 2, 11 and 15 for reference to historic waters, 
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/sey2120.pdf  
77 United States Department of State Bureau of Ocean and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
Limits in the Seas No.36, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions, 8th Revision, March 25, 2000 at p.138, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/61543.pdf  
78 Section 32(2) of Act No.2 of 1999 
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waters of the Mediterranean off its coasts, as well as the exploitation of the shallow inshore 
banks for fixed fisheries for the catching of swimming species, and of the deeper banks for 
the collection of sedentary species, namely sponges.79 According to the ICJ: 
 
“It is clearly the case that, basically, the notion of historic rights or waters and 
that of the continental shelf are governed by distinct legal régimes in customary 
international law. The first régime is based on acquisition and occupation, while 
the second is based on the existence of rights 'ipso facto and ab initio". No doubt 
both may sometimes coincide in part or in whole, but such coincidence can only 
be fortuitous, as in the case of Tunisia where the fishing areas cover the access to 
its continental shelf, though only as far as they go. While it may be that Tunisia's 
historic rights and titles are more nearly related to the concept of the exclusive 
economic zone, which may be regarded as part of modern international law, 
Tunisia has not chosen to base its claims upon that concept.”80 
 
In the Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration, Eritrea, another African State claimed historic rights 
based on the Eritrean people’s historic use of the resources around the waters around the 
islands of Hanis and Zugar as well as the islands of Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr, including 
fishing, trading, shell and pearl diving, guano and mineral extraction, and all associated 
activities on land including drying fish, drawing water, religious and burial practices, and 
building and occupying shelters for sleep and refuge.81 The Tribunal described this practice 
as follows: 
 
This traditionally prevailing situation reflected deeply rooted cultural patterns 
leading to the existence of what could be characterized from a juridical point of 
view as res communis permitting the African as well as the Yemeni fishermen to 
operate with no limitation throughout the entire area and to sell their catch at the 
local markets on either side of the Red Sea. Equally, the persons sailing for 
fishing or trading purposes from one coast to the other used to take temporary 
refuge from the strong winds on any of the uninhabited islands scattered in that 
maritime zone without encountering difficulties of a political or administrative 
nature82 
 
The Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal declared that the recognition of each party’s sovereignty over 
various islands was not inimical to the historic fishing rights of the other State within the 
adjacent waters of the respective islands. According to the Tribunal: 
 
                                                          
79 Continental Shelf (Tunisia v.Libya), Judgement, 24 February, 1982, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18 at 72-73, 
paras.98-99 and Eritrea v.Yemen Arbitration, Second Stage, Delimitation at p.13 
80 Ibid para 100 
81 Eritrea v.Yemen Arbitration, Second Stage, Delimitation at p.13 




“This existing regime has operated, as the evidence presented to the Tribunal 
amply testifies, around the Hanish and Zuqar islands and the islands of Jebel al-
Tayr and the Zubayr group. In the exercise of its sovereignty over these islands, 
Yemen shall ensure that the traditional fishing regime of free access and 
enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen shall be preserved for the 
benefit of the lives and livelihoods of this poor and industrious order of men.”83 
 
During the UNCLOS III, there did not seem to be a consensus amongst African States on 
whether historic rights falling short of a claim to sovereignty was still applicable, especially 
in the light of the introduction of new maritime zones, such as the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). For instance, Zaire(now the Democratic Republic of Congo), appeared to suggest in 
the UNCLOS III that despite the emergence of the concept of the EEZ that based on ‘the 
principle of regional solidarity’ that ‘some geographically disadvantaged States had a 
legitimate claim to certain historical rights’ in the EEZ of another State.84 This may be 
contrasted with the position of another African State, South Africa, at the same meeting. It 
took the view that although under the EEZ concept a Coastal State,  unable to exploit its 
fisheries fully may allow other States to share in the exploitation of those resources on a non-
discriminatory basis, it stressed that this would be done ‘without necessarily recognizing the 
so-called traditional fishing rights of foreign States in the zone’.85 The South African 
delegation insisted that such right to exploit the fisheries resources should be left to the sole 
discretion of the Coastal State to which the EEZ appertains.86 
 
It is quite fascinating to note that the African Union, as the collective body representing the 
55 States in Africa,87 in its more recent engagement with the issue of the Oceans and seas in 
the African Maritime Domain under the broad auspices of the so-called African Blue/Ocean 
Economy does not directly address the issue of historic rights. For instance, the recent 2050 
Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) which is intended to provide an 
African-driven long-term and reasonably comprehensive strategy on Africa’s engagement 
with the maritime space of Africa does not specifically mention historic rights and titles.88 
                                                          
83 Ibid at para. 526 
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85 Paras.2 and 3, Ibid 
86 See Articles 61 and 62 of UNCLOS 82. 
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The Strategy under the heading ‘Maritime Boundaries/Delineation’ states that: ‘Member 
States are further urged to accept and fulfil all those responsibilities that emanate from the 
establishment of maritime zones as foreseen by UNCLOS and the IMO SOLAS 
Convention.’89(Italics provided by this author for emphasis) This rather ambiguous provision is 
not helpful in clarifying the issue of historic rights and titles under international law, and whether 
African States practice recognises this as legal under international law. On the one hand, it could 
be argued that neither UNCLOS 82 and the IMO SOLAS Convention obviously ‘foresees’ the 
application of historic rights and titles because they do not specifically and explicitly address 
these concepts.90 Moreover, the AIM Strategy does not specifically refer to CIL or General 
International Law to give room for African States to claim historic rights or titles under CIL or 
General International Law. It should be noted that the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal had 
stated: “…the system of maritime zones created by the Convention [UNCLOS 82] was intended 
to be comprehensive and to cover any area of sea or seabed.”91 On the other hand, it could be 
argued that the references in certain places in UNCLOS 82 to historic rights and titles, though this 
was not expatiated on, and the explicit incorporation of general international law in the preamble 
of UNCLOS, it could be argued that UNCLOS does ‘foresee’ and incorporates such CIL rules on 
historic titles.92   
 
Neither does the recent African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in 
Africa (Lomé Charter), which was adopted in 2016(though yet to come into force) under the 
auspices of the African Union, with the awareness ‘of the geostrategic importance of the seas, 
oceans and inland waterways in the socio-economic development of Africa and of their role in 
sustainable development of the continent,’93 explicitly engage with the issue of historic rights. 
However, it is intriguing to note that in defining maritime zones, the Charter states that this 
means ‘maritime zones as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) adopted on 10 December 1982.’94 It is worthy of note that it does not include the 
additional phrase such as ‘and under general international law’ which could have given room for 
incorporating maritime zones that have or may emerge under customary international law. The 
implication of this would appear to indicate that the Charter would only recognise maritime zones 
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89 Para.59, AIM Strategy, Ibíd. 
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in Africa that are explicitly defined under the UNCLOS 82 and arguably, this would exclude 
historic titles since these are not explicitly defined in UNCLOS. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The issue of whether historic rights in maritime waters are still valid rights under modern 
international law is still a rather debatable point. This chapter has sought to explore various 
African State Practice, using State Practice in a broad sense, as regard historic waters claims 
and claims to historic rights falling short of sovereignty claims. The review of African State 
Practice on historic rights reveals that although there are some State Practice in Africa on 
such historic titles and claims, the practices are rather limited and not sufficiently widespread 
or uniform enough to amount to an agreed African interpretation of the UNCLOS or  
sufficiently extensive practice that could validly contribute, along with other States Practices 
in other regions, to support a contention of the existence of parallel rules of customary 
international law, which compliments the rather meagre UNCLOS 82 provisions on historic 
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